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Abstract
This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves
for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in
the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support
him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-
period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to
the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore
approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit
few, or even none, of them. The results are robust. But institutional ar-
rangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter’s power by
reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as
sequential voting) can increase a legislator’s ability to resist exploitation.
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1 Introduction
Much legislation is usefully viewed as imposing a tax on all legislators (or their
constituents), and distributing the benefits among only some individuals or
groups. It may therefore appear that proposed legislation can gain majority
support only if in a majority of districts the amounts distributed exceed the
taxes collected. The existence of large majorities thus suggests wide benefits
from a policy. Nevertheless, redistributive legislation often gains strong political
support though benefits are concentrated among few districts (as with farm
bills).1 In these cases suspicion falls on special interests with much influence.
Our explanation differs, allowing current policy proposals and voting out-
comes to depend not only on current benefits, but also on past decisions and
on expectations of future behavior. These implicit connections between policies
were well captured by a study of the Connecticut legislature (Barber 1996) that
reports
But for a considerable number, the relevant patronage is not that
which can be offered here and now, but, in effect, all the patronage
which the leaders are expected to control in the future. For these
members the important thing is to build a favorable record of party
service, so that when and if some opportunity is presented, perhaps
years hence, they will be among the eligibles. . . Party allegiance is
motivated in part by vague hopes that sometime in the future, should
the member want help of some unspecified kind—a job, an adminis-
trative decision, a local bill passed—the leadership would remember
his yeoman service in the party ranks. As one legislator said, “It
isn’t what you’ve been promised, it’s what you hope for that helps,
that will swing a person into line.”
The analysis below formalizes and extends this idea, focusing on an agenda
setter who issues promises and threats, showing how he can induce a majority of
1Agricultural policy in the U.S. is periodically renewed. Consider the Food, Conservation,
and Energy Act of 2008. It passed in the House (Vote #353) by 306/110 and in the Senate
(Vote #144) by 77/15. Moreover, both the House and the Senate overrode a veto by the
President with a 2/3 majority. Data on commodity subsidies from 1995–2010 for 400 congres-
sional districts shows that the 24 districts (6% of all districts listed) that received the largest
subsidies obtained 52.8% of the total of $167.3 billion.
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legislators to vote for a policy that directly benefits few, or even none, of them:
he threatens legislators voting against him in one period that he will exclude
them from the winning coalition in a following period. Of course, an agenda
setter cannot always exploit the legislature; for example, he may be unable to
forbid amendments to a policy he proposes. Rather, one contribution of our
analysis is to point to conditions that allow for exploitation, and conditions or
institutional arrangements that limit it.
A classic example of a legislative leader who long controlled the agenda
and used this power, among other powers, to control policy is Joseph Cannon,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1903 to 1911, and called at
the time the “Tyrant from Illinois.” He was reported to punish disloyal mem-
bers by refusing to schedule their favored legislation, and declining to recognize
them to offer amendments or private bills. When chairing the House Rules
Committee, he limited amendments that could be made on the floor of the
House. Nevertheless, he did not punish all opponents or reward all supporters.
Our model can explain how an agenda setter can wield great power even when
rewards and punishments are rare or small.
Our analysis has more than historical interest. Though currently the Speaker
has less power than Cannon enjoyed, congressional committees have agenda-
setting powers, particularly when the vote on the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives is made under the closed rule.2 Thus, congressmen with some agenda-
setting power enjoy greater pork-barrel spending in their districts. Such con-
gressmen include party leaders (Balla et al. 2002; Hird 1991), committee chairs
(Ferejohn 1974), and members of prestige committees, especially the Appropri-
ations Committee (de Figueiredo and Silverman 2006). Members of Congress
with proposal power—those sitting on the Transportation Committee—get more
spending on transportation projects in their districts than do other congressmen
(Knight 2005).3
A study of earmarks in senatorial bills finds that the number of earmarks
2Price (2006) reports that the incidence of completely closed rules that preclude the offering
of any amendments whatsoever, including the traditional minority substitute, was 28% in the
108th Congress (2003-2005). Doran (2010) reports that the closed rule is now used for half of
the controversial House floor agenda.
3Because, however, different committees may have agenda-setting powers over different
policy areas, the benefits members of any one committee can gain may be smaller than the
benefits gained by an agenda setter with control over all policy proposals, which we consider.
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Senate majority leader Harry Reid received was more than one standard devia-
tion above the mean number of earmarks for the Senate (Engstrom and Vanberg
2010). In both the Senate and the House, members of the Appropriations Com-
mittees received larger earmarks. In the House, party leaders received more
earmarks (Lazarus and Steigerwalt 2009). Similarly, Hardin (1958) argues that
farm policy is inefficient, but nevertheless supported in the U.S. Congress, be-
cause committee chairmen with agenda power come from farm districts.
In different settings different people can set the agenda. Under fast-track
legislation in the U.S., the president proposes a treaty that Congress can either
accept or reject, but not amend. In the European Union, the Commission has
significant agenda-setting power: in some policy domains, only the Commission
can propose a policy, and the power of the Council and the Parliament to amend
the proposal may be restricted (as by super-majority requirements) depending
on the legislative procedure used. Many parliamentary democracies allow the
government to propose a policy as a confidence vote, which the legislature can
adopt or reject, but not amend. In Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal
and Spain, the constitution authorizes the government to make policies ques-
tions of confidence. By convention, the government can make the vote on a
specific policy a question of confidence in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Other parliaments permit
votes of confidence. For example, in 1995 members of the Italian Lower House
proposed more than 150 amendments to a budget introduced by the Prime Min-
ister. The Prime Minister eventually invoked a confidence vote procedure on
his budget package, which the legislature passed without the amendments.4
The agenda setter could more generally be the bureaucracy, as in the seminal
work by Romer and Rosenthal (1978). But their model underestimates the
agenda setter’s power, because it assumes voters must be indifferent between
the proposal and the status quo, without looking at the bureaucracy’s ability
to punish opponents. Niskanen (1971) similarly assumes that the executive
branch’s power is limited to making take-it-or-leave-it offers. Thus, they do not
consider the possibility that all voters vote for a policy in some period which
hurts them all. We do.
Our model has the agenda setter credibly punish legislators. Such threats are
observed. When Senator James Buckley tried to delete forty-four public works
4This discussion of confidence votes is based on Huber (1996).
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projects at the committee stage in the Senate, the members voted down all his
amendments, but cut out projects in his home state (as reported by Epple and
Riordan 1987). Senator William Proxmire was similarly punished for supporting
proposals to cut appropriations for the Department of the Interior—a House-
Senate Conference Committee deleted the senator’s favored project from the
Interior appropriations bill (see Ferejohn 1974, p. 114).
The problem we address differs from logrolling. Logrolling has a majority
of legislators support a package of policies which benefit each member of the
majority, though any one component benefits only one legislator. We consider
a policy proposal that hurts all legislators.
Our model has several important features. Some of these are found in other
work, but no work has all of them. First, in equilibrium, in period 1 all leg-
islators vote for a policy that gives each of them negative utility, whereas the
outside option gives each zero utility. The result is therefore much stronger
than merely saying that a supermajority support redistribution to a minority.
Second, the result is reasonably robust, holding when voting is by secret bal-
lot, when the time horizon is finite, when the agenda setter can be replaced,
and when legislators can be replaced. Third, the result is time consistent—the
agenda setter need not commit to an action in period 2 that he would prefer
to avoid. Fourth, the result holds even if a legislator’s vote is decisive. It is
not merely that a legislator votes for the bad policy because the outcome would
be the same if he voted against the bad policy; instead each legislator strictly
prefers to vote for the bad policy. Fifth, in contrast to results that appear be-
cause the Folk Theorem applies in a game with an infinite horizon, our results
apply in a game with two periods. In contrast to bargaining models which show
that any distribution of a surplus can be sustained in equilibrium, we consider
a negative-sum game.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews related litera-
ture. Sections 3 and 4 formalize a benchmark model of agenda setting in which
the proposer controls the agenda: he is the unique proposer, amendments are
not possible, and he is certain to stay in power. Sections 5 and 6 consider dif-
ferent institutional arrangements, investigating whether they can balance power
between the agenda setter and the legislature. This highlights the importance
of, for example, the cohesion of the legislature to sustain tacit collusion against
the agenda setter, or the separation of budgetary powers and entitlements. It
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also yields the surprising finding that a secret ballot alone might not be enough.
The last section contains concluding remarks.
2 Literature
2.1 Agenda setting
Studies of agenda setting usually need to refine equilibrium predictions by con-
sidering ‘simple’ strategies which only depend on current payoff-relevant vari-
ables. This constraint precludes investigating the power of promises and threats,
on which we focus.
Important early contributions include Romer and Rosenthal (1978), Baron
and Ferejohn (1989), Baron (1989), and Harrington (1990). They assume that
in each period any legislator can be chosen to make a proposal. In proposing
and voting on policies, a legislator must thus compare the benefits from the
proposal to the status quo, and to a future proposal in which the legislator may
be excluded from the minimum winning coalition. The sequence of proposal
makers gives an early proposer power to gain more benefits to himself than
other members of the majority gain. In important extensions, Ali, Bernheim
and Fan (2014) show that even if legislators are uncertain about who will be
the agenda setter in following periods, and even if it is known that the current
agenda setter will be replaced, the first proposer can extract the entire surplus
for himself in every subgame perfect equilibrium of a finite horizon game. The
essential intuition is that the inability of future agenda setters to commit to
who will get benefits gives a current agenda setter much power. Our result is
even stronger: in some periods each member of the legislature is made strictly
worse off by the policy they unanimously pass. Whereas other papers look at
the division of a fixed prize, we look at a tax-cum-spending policy which allows
for negative utility for legislators supporting the policy.
Some work considers endogenously evolving default policies, and yield ex-
ploitation results closer to ours. How legislators can obtain local benefits is
discussed by Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo (2006), who consider the default pol-
icy changing from period to period, a single policy implemented in the final
period, and the agenda setter in each period offering a policy which depends on
the policy that was most recently adopted. The authors show that a majority
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may support a pork-barrel policy which hurts almost every legislator. Anesi and
Seidmann (2013) show in a related model that even a non-proposer may obtain
all of the surplus. Other papers consider a sequence of policies. Kalandrakis
(2004) considers a continuous policy space, and Diermeier and Fong (2011) con-
sider a discrete policy in modeling a legislature in which a player is selected at
random to make a proposal in each round. The proposal is pitted against the
status quo, with the winning alternative becoming the status quo in the next
round of bargaining. The equilibrium has the proposer eventually extract all
benefits for himself in all periods. If, however, a policy can be reconsidered,
then legislators have an incentive to protect each other and limit the power of
the agenda setter.
2.2 Size of winning coalitions
The literature looks at two extreme forms of winning coalitions. One ap-
proach, introduced by Riker (1962), predicts the existence of minimum winning
coalitions—why should the agenda setter, or for that matter any member of the
majority, offer anything to the minority. The models of agenda setting described
above also predict minimum winning coalitions.
The other extreme examines conditions under which policies will be passed
by very large majorities, with benefits going to almost all legislators. Legislators
operating under a “veil of ignorance” (they do not know which coalitions will
form in the future) will adopt a norm of universalism that calls for all legislators
to benefit from pork barrel projects (Weingast 1979, Shepsle and Weingast 1981,
and Grofman 1984). Costs of drafting policy can affect the policies a legislator
proposes, by inducing him to propose policies which are supported by a large
majority of legislators (Glazer and McMillan 1992), or by proposing policies
which other legislators would later not want to amend (Glazer and McMillan
1990). An extension of the Baron-Ferejohn model to consider incomplete infor-
mation is given by Tsai and Yang (2010), showing that oversized coalitions may
appear. Relatedly, the Baron-Ferejohn model with sequential voting is exam-
ined by Norman (2002), who shows that any allocation of benefits can constitute
an equilibrium. In a model of endogenously evolving default policies, Anesi and
Seidmann (2015) show that oversized coalitions can be an equilibrium feature.
But in these models no one suffers from a policy; in our model all legislators
prefer that the agenda setter’s proposal be rejected.
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Work on vote buying shows that the equilibrium may have supermajorities.
In Groseclose and Snyder (1996) and Banks (2000) the special interest which
moves first buys a supermajority of votes to make vote buying prohibitively
expensive for the special interest which moves second. Zapal (2013) finds that
the equilibrium can have supermajorities in a model with a single vote buyer
who can give favors to legislators, but is uncertain how legislators will vote.
Felgenhauer and Gru¨ner (2008) also consider a single vote buyer and uncertainty
in voting, studying information aggregation under secret and non-secret ballots.
2.3 Punishing opponents and rewarding supporters
The idea that a political leader rewards supporters and punishes opponents is of
course not novel. The Introduction mentioned how Joseph Cannon, as Speaker
of the House of Representatives, used such tools. Papers discussed above had an
agenda setter ignore how legislators voted in the past in deciding what proposal
to make. When such history is considered, punishment strategies can arise: an
agenda setter who can exclude from the majority coalition legislators who had
voted against him can capture a large share of the budget (Baron and Ferejohn
1989, Cotton 2010).
Dal Bo´ (2007) analyzes how an outside party can use bribes that are condi-
tional on the realized voting profile to influence committee decisions. He shows
that a special interest group can generate unanimous approval, although in
equilibrium payments are very small. His key insight is that “pivotal bribes,”
in which a legislator is paid if and only if he casts a decisive vote for the policy,
render the voting game a multilateral prisoners’ dilemma.5 Though the analy-
sis below relies on these insights, the influence mechanism differs from his—we
allow compensations to be conditioned only on a legislator’s vote, which un-
der his model does not allow for costless capture. Dal Bo´ assumes the special
interest commits to payments it will make after votes are realized, whereas in
our setting compensations are costless for the agenda setter and thus credible.
Whereas Dal Bo´ allows for cash payments, in much of our analysis the agenda
setter is restricted to excluding or including legislators in a minimum winning
coalition in a future period. That limitation may appear to limit greatly an
5The model is extended by Console-Battilana and Shepsle (2009), who consider payments
that either the president or lobbying groups can make to induce legislators to confirm the
appointment of a supreme court justice.
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agenda-setter’s power in earlier periods; we show when it does not. One way
of noting that our approach differs fundamentally is that our mechanism will
operate only if legislators vote in sequence on at least two policies; results in
Dal Bo´ appear even if legislators vote only once.
An incumbent, even one who pursues policies that most oppose, can stay
in power if members of the incumbent’s winning coalition are more likely to
become members of the winning coalition in the future than are members of the
challenger’s coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002). The PRI party in Mexico
maintained power by threatening districts that did not support it that they will
be denied private benefits from the central government which the PRI controlled
(see Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003). Relatedly, a group’s fear
of later falling under an inefficient and venal ruler who favors another group
can suffice to discipline supporters (Padro´ i Miquel 2007). And in discussing
governance, Dixit (2009) argues that private order can be sustained by the threat
of expulsion. Punishment strategies can be more effective if the principal has
some discretion, as shown below in considering entitlements. The importance
of discretion in allowing punishment is analyzed by Bernheim and Whinston
(1998), who show that when some outcomes cannot be verified, leaving the
obligations of contracting parties vague or unspecified can enhance efficiency.
The power of an agenda setter to punish opponents is considered by Epple
and Riordan (1987), who examine repeated interactions, with different individ-
uals having the right to propose policies in different periods, showing that a
wide range of allocations can be sustained as equilibria by the threat of political
banishment. Like them, we suppose that the punishment for defection is exclu-
sion, which in equilibrium is not invoked. Their result on plutocracy resembles
our result about the agenda setter exploiting others. But whereas they consider
punishment by multiple legislators, we consider punishment by the agenda set-
ter. They consider an infinite horizon whereas we have a finite horizon. And
whereas they consider complicated strategies, ours is simple. Moreover, we ex-
tend the analysis in several ways, including sequential voting, tacit collusion,
and the agenda setter’s decision of whether to privilege the status quo.
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3 Assumptions
We start the analysis with a simple benchmark model. Most assumptions are
generalized in later sections.
There are four players. One person, say the President, or the Speaker of
the House, or the majority of a legislative committee, is the agenda setter in
each of two periods.6 He, and only he, can propose a policy. The legislature
consists of three members. The agenda setter’s proposal is adopted if a ma-
jority of legislators vote for it (or vote yes). (We later extend the analysis to
consider super-majority and unanimity rules.) Votes are public and simulta-
neous. The agenda setter does not vote. The assumptions are consistent with
an interpretation of the agenda setter as the U.S. President who is not a mem-
ber of Congress, or the European Commission which submits a proposal to the
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.7
In each of two periods the agenda setter proposes a policy that costs a dollar,
and that divides that dollar (perhaps unequally) among the three legislators
and himself. If the policy is adopted, a tax of $1/3 is imposed on each of the
three legislators. If the policy is rejected, no tax is paid and no benefits are
distributed.8
In period 1, the agenda setter must treat each legislator equally; he cannot
target a subset of legislators or make the payments conditional on votes. One
justification is that, as we show in the context of Proposition 1 below, sometimes
the agenda setter can obtain the whole surplus in period 1 and thus prefers
not to build a minimum winning coalition in both periods. In this case our
6Consistent with our assumptions, Primo (2002) notes that most political bargaining in
the U.S. Congress has only one actor make a formal proposal. Also, consistent with our
assumption that the agenda setter remains in power, Cotton (2010) reports that agenda-
setting authority in the U.S. Congress rarely changes hands. Since the first U.S. Congress in
1789, for example, there have been only 59 changes in the Speaker of the House, of which no
more than 24 can be attributed to the speaker losing support amongst his party. Diermeier
and Fong (2011) give further examples of institutions, among them central banks, in which
an agenda setter persistently controls proposals.
7Were the agenda setter a voting member of the legislature, he would find it easier to
win approval for his proposal—he would need the support of fewer legislators (just one other
legislator is needed as opposed to two in our setting, in which the agenda setter has no vote).
8 An alternative version of our model considers a legislature composed of three legislators,
who each pay taxes and vote, with one of them the agenda setter. This would not change our
qualitative results; details are available upon request.
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assumption is innocuous and simplifies the exposition. Second, as discussed in
the context of Proposition 2 below, sometimes the agenda setter would do better
without this restriction. In this case our assumption makes it more difficult to
explain support for the proposal made in period 1, and so makes our results
more striking.9 In period 2 the agenda setter can again propose to impose a tax
of $1/3 on each legislator, and to distribute the $1 thus raised between himself
and legislators in any way he wants.
The agenda setter maximizes his benefits, subject to the constraint that his
proposal is approved only if a majority of legislators vote for it. His possibilities
in period 1 are as follows. He proposes to impose a tax of 1/3 on each legislator,
to give s ≤ 1/3 to each legislator, and to give 1−3s to himself. Optimization by
the agenda setter requires minimizing the side payments s; we will investigate
how s depends on the institutional constraints.
Each legislator cares only about the net benefits he gets. He votes yes if
the present discounted value of doing so exceeds the present discounted value
of voting no.
We look at subgame perfect, or time-consistent, solutions. Collusion in a
two-period model is therefore impossible. The intertemporal discount factor is
δ > 0. The time line is as follows
1. The agenda setter proposes a policy, which describes benefits to himself
and to each legislator, and a tax divided equally among the legislators to
finance the benefits.
2. The agenda setter’s proposal is adopted if a majority of legislators vote
yes
3. Payoffs are realized
4. The agenda setter again proposes a policy, which describes benefits to him-
self and to each legislator, and a tax divided equally among the legislators
to finance the benefits.
5. The agenda setter’s proposal is adopted if a majority of legislators vote
yes
9For example, in the context of Proposition 2 below, without this restriction the agenda
setter could secure approval of his proposal in period 1 at lower cost to himself by offering a
share of the dollar to only two legislators.
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6. Payoffs are realized
4 Benchmark result
Let the agenda setter use the following strategy. In period 1 he threatens that
any legislator who votes no will be politically banished, in the sense that his
chance of becoming a member of a future minimum winning coalition is smaller
than that of a legislator who voted yes. In period 2 the agenda setter proposes
to split a dollar equally with the members of a minimum winning coalition. Any
legislator who supported him in period 1 has an equal chance of belonging to
the minimum winning coalition in period 2.10 If a minimum winning coalition
requires more members than the number of legislators who voted yes in period
1, then the remaining members are chosen with equal probability among the
legislators who voted no in period 1. Call this the exclusion strategy.
Consider period 2. In that period the agenda setter proposes to give 1/3
to each of the two legislators, 0 to the third legislator, 1/3 to himself, and a
tax of 1/3 on each of the legislators. No member of the minimum winning
coalition (the two legislators offered 1/3 each) gains by rejecting the proposal,
and the proposal is supported by a majority. An equilibrium does exist with all
legislators voting no in period 2—no one legislator’s vote can then change the
outcome, and thus no legislator has an incentive to deviate. This equilibrium,
however, is not robust to a trembling hand.11 We shall refer to equilibria in
which this refinement applies as robust equilibria.
Turn now to period 1. Given that all legislators face the same situation, we
focus on a symmetric equilibrium in pure voting strategies. Consider a given
legislator who expects all other legislators to vote yes. Notice that a single
vote does not change the outcome of the collective decision which approves
the proposal. A legislator who votes yes has a 2/3 chance of belonging to the
10Norman (2002) makes a similar assumption. We assume equal chances for simplicity; the
results hold under weaker assumptions (see the discussion after Proposition 1).
11Assume that the agenda setter plays an exclusion strategy in which he offers in period 2 a
very small benefit b > 0 to members of the winning coalition. If with some small probability
one of the legislators will vote for the agenda setter’s proposal in period 2, then a legislator
favored by that proposal strictly prefers to vote yes. The following uses this refinement,
supposing that the period 2 proposal is accepted. A technical issue concerns the existence of
the optimal amount to offer. That may be solved by making the realistic assumption that a
smallest monetary unit exists.
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minimum winning coalition in period 2, in which case his benefit is 1/3. So,
considering the taxes he will pay, his expected net benefit when he votes yes is
−1/3(1 + δ) + s + δ2/9. A legislator who votes no will be excluded from the
minimum winning coalition in period 2; his payoff is only −1/3(1+δ)+s. Thus,
for any s a legislator strictly prefers to vote yes in period 1. It is an equilibrium
for each legislator to vote yes.12
The agenda setter maximizes his surplus by setting s = 0; because he obtains
the largest possible surplus, clearly he has no better strategy. In period 1 he
obtains the whole surplus, whereas in period 2 his surplus is maximized subject
to the constraint that the proposal be accepted. Further reducing the share
given members of the minimum winning coalition in period 2 would yield strictly
negative benefits to each member, causing them to reject the proposal. The
above strategies thus constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Moreover, a Nash equilibrium in pure voting strategies cannot have all leg-
islators in period 1 vote no. Assume they do. Again a single vote does not
change the outcome of the collective decision which rejects the proposal. But a
legislator who votes yes in period 1 will belong to the minimum winning coali-
tion in period 2. Hence, a legislator who votes yes has zero payoff in period 2.
Voting no reduces the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition
in period 2, so that total payoffs are 0 + δ(2/9 − 1/3) < 0. The difference is
δ/9 > 0, which represents the benefit from ensuring membership in the mini-
mum winning coalition in period 2. Thus, a legislator strictly prefers to vote
yes in period 1; it is not an equilibrium for all legislators to vote no.
We summarize with
Proposition 1 A symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in pure voting strate-
gies exists in which
• the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy with s = 0 and
12We do not have data on whether overwhelming majorities support policies which benefit
the agenda setter. But data do show that much legislation is passed with very large majori-
ties. King and Zeckhauser (2003) report that in the 1997-98 session of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 324 non-procedural roll-call votes, which constitute 42% of the total, passed
with more than 300 votes in a chamber with 435 members. The results are not atypical.
Data on the U.S. House of Representatives over the years 1873-1998 show that overwhelming
majorities (with ninety percent of those voting on the same side) appear on over forty percent
of the roll-call votes in several sessions, and occur on over 25 percent of the roll-call votes in
about half of the congressional sessions (Gaines and Sala 2000).
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• in period 1 the legislature unanimously approves the agenda setter’s pro-
posal; in period 2 a minimum winning coalition approves the proposal the
agenda setter makes in that period.
Moreover, for any exclusion strategy with s ≥ 0, it is not a robust equilibrium
for legislators to vote unanimously against the agenda setter’s proposal in period
1.
The qualitative results are not a knife-edge; they do not require that in period
2 the agenda setter must be indifferent about the composition of his coalition.
First, for emotional reasons, in period 2 the agenda setter may prefer to exclude
someone who had voted against him in period 1. Second, the motivation for
the agenda setter to randomize among the legislators who voted no in period
1 is analogous to the standard argument for mixed-strategies: mixed strategies
produce unpredictable choices that cannot be exploited by the members of the
legislature. Third, all that is needed for the results is that a legislator who
voted yes in period 1 will more likely belong to the winning coalition in period
2 than a legislator who voted no. The agenda setter’s choice would be equally
unpredictable were it common knowledge that if all legislators vote yes in period
1, legislators 1, 2 and 3 will be included in the minimum winning coalition in
period 2 with probability 1/3, 2/3 and 1, respectively.13
The behavior of legislators could make voters in any one legislative district
dislike what the legislature does (adopt policies that hurt all districts), but like
what the legislator from their own district does (minimize losses to the district,
given how other legislators vote). In the United States, that would lead voters
to hate Congress but to like their own congressman, a pattern consistent with
polling results. For example, a Gallup poll in 2013 finds the common pattern
that “...when thinking about Congress as a whole, Americans are nearly as sour
as they have ever been, but when they think just about their own representative,
they feel much better about the job that person is doing.”14
Proposition 1 imposes two restrictions that when relaxed might lead to fur-
ther equilibria: voting strategies in period 1 are symmetric and pure. The next
13 We could derive asymmetric probabilities analogously to recent micro-foundations for
contest success functions by Corcho´n and Dahm (2010 and 2011). One possibility assumes
that the agenda setter is not indifferent about the identity of the legislators included in the
period 2 minimum winning coalition, and legislators are uncertain about the agenda setter’s
preferences. Details are available upon request.
14www.gallup.com/poll/162362/americans−down−congress−own−representative.aspx.
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subsection explores the existence of asymmetric equilibria. Appendix A.1 shows
that even allowing for mixed voting strategies, when the discount factor is suf-
ficiently large (roughly greater than 0.6), the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is
the unique robust symmetric equilibrium . The reason is that for high discount
factors, the agenda setter can offer sufficient side payments so that an equilib-
rium with mixed strategies does not exist. For low discount factors, however,
an equilibrium with mixed strategies does exist. But it is not surprising that
the agenda setter loses power as the future becomes less important, because
his power is based on his ability to allocate future benefits. Moreover, even
with mixed strategies the legislature approves the proposal in period 1 with
positive probability, implying that the agenda setter can sometimes exploit the
legislature.
4.1 Eliminating asymmetric equilibria with side payments
Suppose legislators respond to the exclusion strategy (when s = 0) by play-
ing asymmetric pure voting strategies in period 1, with two legislators voting
against and one legislator voting for the agenda setter’s proposal.15 Then the
agenda setter’s payoffs in period 1 are zero; he could benefit by increasing s.
We therefore ask whether some side payment s ≤ 1/3 eliminates asymmetric
equilibria in period 1, and assures approval of the agenda setter’s proposal in
period 1. And if such an s exists, we determine its minimum value.
Consider the decision of some legislator in period 1. In an equilibrium with
asymmetric pure strategies some legislator, whose vote is decisive, votes no. In
voting yes he obtains −1/3(1 + δ) + s + δ/3; voting no yields −δ/3 + δ/6. A
yes vote is advantageous if and only if s ≥ (2 − δ)/6. Notice that (2 − δ)/6
strictly decreases in δ, and lies in the interval [1/6, 1/3]. The more important
the future, the more valuable the future benefits of membership in the minimum
winning coalition, and the easier it is for the agenda setter to sway the legislator.
Moreover, for any δ > 0, some feasible payment yields the agenda setter strictly
positive payoffs in period 1, and induces legislators to vote yes. Thus, equilibria
with asymmetric pure strategies in period 1 which reject the agenda setter’s
15Asymmetry requires identical legislators to behave differently. In the setting of the previ-
ous section no underlying asymmetry allows legislators to coordinate and generate a particular
form of asymmetric behavior. A sequential voting procedure could model such an asymmetry
in a natural way. This extension is considered in Subsection 4.2.
15
proposal disappear.
To show that this strategy of the agenda setter and unanimous approval in
period 1 are an equilibrium, it remains to consider a given legislator who is not
decisive. As the vote does not change the outcome in period 1, but increases the
legislator’s chances of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in period 2,
for any s he strictly prefers to vote yes.
Thus, it is optimal for the agenda setter to offer s = (2− δ)/6. This value is
the smallest payment that in period 1 makes it a (weakly) dominant strategy for
each legislator to vote yes. As a result, it precludes legislators from coordinating
on an asymmetric equilibrium in period 1.
The above strategies thus constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. We
summarize with
Proposition 2 Suppose legislators respond to the exclusion strategy (for small
s) by playing asymmetric pure strategies in period 1. Then a subgame perfect
equilibrium exists in which
• the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy with s = (2− δ)/6 and
• in period 1 the legislature unanimously approves the agenda setter’s pro-
posal; in period 2 a minimum winning coalition approves the proposal the
agenda setter makes in that period.
4.2 Agenda-setting power when each vote is decisive
The equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2 base the agenda setter’s ex-
clusion strategy on two characteristics. First, in equilibrium no individual leg-
islator is decisive and therefore cannot block the proposal in period 1. Second,
the agenda setter can condition future benefits or political exclusion on votes
in period 1.16 To show that what drives our result is the second characteris-
tic, we modify our previous assumptions and suppose that voting is sequential,
with voting order 1, 2, 3. As before, assume that the agenda setter plays the
exclusion strategy. Sequential voting does not change the incentives in period
2, and in period 2 a minimum winning coalition will vote yes.
16Under a secret ballot future benefits or political exclusion cannot in principle be condi-
tioned on votes cast in period 1. Subsection 5.2 discusses conditions under which Proposition
1 continues to hold.
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Suppose the agenda setter sets low payments, say s = 0. Then in period 1 a
legislator votes no if and only if he is decisive. Therefore, legislator 1 votes yes,
and free rides on the no votes of the other two legislators.
On the other hand, Proposition 2 already showed that sufficiently high pay-
ments in period 1 make it a (weakly) dominant strategy for each legislator to
vote for the proposal in period 1. We thus have the result that under sequential
voting, a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which the agenda setter plays
the exclusion strategy with s = (2 − δ)/6 and in period 1 the legislature votes
unanimously for the agenda setter’s proposal; in period 2 a minimum winning
coalition supports the proposal the agenda setter makes in that period. A com-
parison to Proposition 1 shows that sequential voting benefits legislators, but
does not eliminate the agenda setter’s power.
Still, in the period 1 voting situation described in the previous paragraph the
legislature unanimously supports the agenda setter’s proposal, so it is not true
that each yes vote is decisive. To show that our results do not depend on the fact
that in equilibrium no individual legislator is decisive, suppose that legislator 1,
who is first in the voting order, votes no. This could happen because he made a
mistake or because a small benefit in the future may not suffice to induce him
to vote yes in period 1. He may have “non-consequentialist” motivations, for
example, because he wishes to express a preference through the act of voting.17
But because the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy with s = (2− δ)/6 it
is a (weakly) dominant strategy for remaining legislators to vote yes in period
1. Thus, the proposal is adopted and each yes vote is decisive. In particular,
when the last legislator in the voting order casts his vote, he has observed the
earlier votes and knows that the outcome depends on his vote.
4.3 Agenda-setting power and a legislator’s pivotal prob-
ability
The analysis above presented two types of voting profiles. In the equilibrium of
Proposition 1 all legislators vote yes in period 1 and no legislator is decisive; in
the equilibrium at the end of Subsection 4.2 two legislators vote yes and both
legislators are decisive. On the other hand, whereas the first situation requires
no side payments, the second does and therefore limits agenda-setting power.
17See Shayo and Harel (2012) for an overview and experimental evidence for this voting
behavior.
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To show that side payments monotonically increase (and agenda-setting
power monotonically decreases) with a legislator’s pivotal probability, we sup-
pose, in line with our assumption in Subsection 4.2, that for some legislator a
small benefit in the future may not suffice to induce him to vote yes in period
1. Assume that it is common knowledge that with probability p one of the leg-
islators, say legislator A, has a “non-consequentialist” attitude and rejects the
proposal. If the proposal in period 1 is approved, the other two legislators are
pivotal, and so p also measures the pivotal probability.18
Consider one of the other two legislators, say B, and assume he expects the
other legislators to vote yes, unless legislator A has a “non-consequentialist”
attitude. In this case he only expects C to vote yes. With probability p he is
in the same voting situation as at the end of Subsection 4.2; with probability
1− p the situation is similar to Proposition 1. More precisely, voting yes yields
p
(
−
1
3
(1 + δ) + s+
δ
3
)
+ (1− p)
(
−
1
3
(1 + δ) + s+
δ
3
2
3
)
;
voting no implies
p
(
−
δ
3
+
δ
3
1
2
)
+ (1− p)
(
−
1
3
(1 + δ) + s
)
.
Hence, each of the two legislators prefers to vote yes in period 1 if and only if
s ≥ s˜(p) ≡ max
{
2− δ
6
−
1− p
p
2δ
9
, 0
}
.
The threshold s˜(p) increases monotonically in the pivotal probability p, until
the payments of Proposition 2 are reached. Notice also that for low values of
the pivotal probability, s˜(p) is constant and zero. Therefore the assumption
of completely consequentialist voters who are solely motivated by preferences
over policy outcomes can be somewhat relaxed without affecting the result in
Proposition 1.
4.4 Observations
Several comments are in order.
18The alternative assumption that with probability p any of the three legislators has “non-
consequentialist” motivations yields qualitatively the same results. The exposition, however,
is more complex because p no longer measures the pivotal probability.
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First, in the above equilibria a legislator’s expected benefit is −1/3(1+ δ)+
s˜(p)+δ2/9. Given the size of the different payments s˜(p), legislators obtain lower
expected payoffs than were both proposals rejected. In period 1 all legislators
vote for a policy that hurts all of them.
Second, exploitation is most severe under the conditions of Proposition 1,
and exploitation declines with a legislator’s pivotal probability. So agenda-
setting power is sensitive to the institutions and behavioral conditions under
which agenda setting takes place. Later sections further analyze the sensitiv-
ity of our conclusions to variations of our assumptions. The monotonicity of
side payments in the pivotal probability suggests that agenda setters are more
powerful in large legislatures, but these issues are not explicitly modeled here.
Third, in the equilibrium of Proposition 1 no legislator is decisive; in con-
trast, in the equilibrium at the end of Subsection 4.2 two legislators vote yes in
period 1, and both legislators are decisive. Thus, the indifference of a legisla-
tor who is not decisive strengthens our result, but is not crucial for unanimous
approval in period 1.
Fourth, in the basic model (under the conditions of Proposition 1) legis-
lators do not have a dominant strategy and thus do not find themselves in a
multilateral prisoners’ dilemma (in which fixing the action of one player, the
others are in a prisoners’ dilemma). But side payments increase the incentives
for defection, thereby allowing the agenda setter to eliminate the equilibrium
with asymmetric voting.
Fifth, crucial for unanimous approval is the agenda setter’s ability in period
2 to reward a legislator who voted yes in period 1. A unanimity rule in period
2 breaks this link between the periods because then in period 2 every vote
is needed and no legislator can be excluded. On the other hand, any scarce
resource controlled by the agenda setter and valued by legislators could establish
such a link. In some situations it is reasonable to interpret the President as
the agenda setter. Rewards could then consist, for example, of invitations to
the White House, fundraisers, or campaign appearances. In other situations
one might think of party leaders as agenda setters, with rewards consisting
of committee assignments and money from political action committees to re-
election campaigns, which are controlled by party leaders.
Sixth, the result in Proposition 1 does not require that the agenda setter
punish with certainty a legislator who voted no in period 1. It suffices that
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in period 2 the agenda setter can exclude a legislator with a small but strictly
positive probability. This result can reconcile the view by historians that Joseph
Cannon, as Speaker of the US House of Representatives, exercised power by
punishing opponents, with the findings by Krehbiel and Wiseman (2001) that in
making committee appointments Cannon did not consistently reward supporters
or punish opponents. For, as shown above, what matters is that when a legislator
is not decisive, the cost to him of voting for a policy he dislikes is small or even
zero, so that if he expects even a small gain from membership in the winning
coalition in a future period, he will support the agenda setter’s policy. Strong
loyalty can appear under weak punishments and rewards.
Seventh, the exclusion strategy which allows the agenda setter to exploit the
legislators in period 1 can also be used by the agenda setter to maintain power.
Suppose that in some period before the final one a motion is made to depose
the agenda setter. The incumbent agenda setter can threaten that if he stays
in power, then in the final period he will give preference for membership in the
minimum winning coalition to any legislator who had voted against the motion.
Then as in the previous analysis, it is a Nash equilibrium for all legislators to
vote to retain the agenda setter, even though he had exploited them and may
exploit them in the future.
Eighth, it is not strictly necessary that the agenda setter’s proposal cannot
be amended in any period. What is critical is that in the final period his
proposal cannot be amended. For in any non-final period, the agenda setter can
use the exclusion strategy against any legislator who proposes an amendment,
and against any legislator who votes for an amendment. In the final period, if
the agenda setter’s proposal cannot be amended, he can indeed implement the
exclusion strategy, punishing legislators who had voted against him.
Ninth, although we spoke of forming a minimum winning coalition in period
2, similar results can appear when in period 2 the agenda setter is very busy,
willing to help legislators with their legislative needs, but giving priority to
legislators who had supported him in the past.
Lastly, the benchmark result continues to hold under more general condi-
tions, among them larger legislatures or legislators who value the future differ-
ently.19 The next section examines further institutions that do not limit the
19 For large legislatures see Subsection 5.3; for heterogeneous legislators details are available
upon request.
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agenda setter’s power. Section 6 considers institutions that do.
5 Institutions that do not limit the agenda set-
ter’s power
Some institutional arrangements, such as secret voting, may at first sight appear
to restrict greatly, or even to eliminate, the agenda setter’s power. We show,
however, that they do not.
5.1 Term limits and turnover
One might expect that term limits and turnover reduce the agenda setter’s
ability to punish or reward legislators. For that result to hold, however, the end
of the legislators’ terms must be soon and certain.
Suppose that each district might be represented in period 2 by a different
legislator. That is, each legislator in period 1 continues only with some proba-
bility in period 2. The result in Proposition 1 is robust, because conditional on
continuing to serve, a legislator who votes yes in period 1 enjoys higher expected
utility over the two periods than he would by voting against.
Suppose now that between the two periods the identity of the agenda setter
may change. More precisely, assume that the probability the agenda setter in
period 1 continues is q. With probability 1 − q in period 2 some other person
makes a proposal which is unrelated to voting in period 1, and yields benefits
pi to the legislator whose votes will be analyzed below.
Let the agenda setter in period 1 use the exclusion strategy. If the agenda
setter continues in period 2, his proposal in period 2 will be accepted by a
minimum winning coalition.
Consider now a given legislator in period 1, and suppose that all other leg-
islators vote yes. Again, a single vote does not affect the collective decision and
the proposal is approved. A legislator who votes yes obtains −1/3(1 + δ) +
δ(2q/9 + (1− q)pi), whereas voting against yields −1/3(1 + δ) + δ(1− q)pi. The
difference is δq2/9 > 0. When q = 1 the trade-off discussed in Section 4 ap-
plies. But for any strictly positive probability that the agenda setter continues
to serve, a legislator strictly prefers to vote yes in period 1.
If in period 1 each legislator expects all others to vote no, no single vote would
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change the outcome of the collective decision which rejects the proposal. But
by voting yes a legislator can ensure his membership in the minimum winning
coalition in period 2 if the agenda setter continues. Thus, each legislator strictly
prefers to vote yes in period 1, and it is not an equilibrium for each legislator
to vote no.
Consider now term limits. Term limits which make a legislator leave before
the agenda setter leaves mean that the legislator will not vote for a policy that
benefits the agenda setter.20 Speaking loosely, term limits may weaken the
power of the agenda setter. Instead, the agenda setter would have to form a
minimum winning coalition of beneficiaries in each period.21
A term limit applying to the agenda setter corresponds to q = 0 in the anal-
ysis above.22 Even in this case, the legislators can be exploited. Suppose the
current agenda setter will never serve again, but that some current member of
the legislature serves as the agenda setter in the future. The current agenda
setter can still propose a policy that benefits himself greatly, while giving noth-
ing to all but one legislator. Let the current agenda setter propose a policy that
gives benefits to himself and to one other legislator, say P, who may become the
agenda setter in period 2. Legislator P would then gain from threatening that
when he becomes the agenda setter, he will propose no benefits to any legisla-
tor who votes against the benefits proposed to P in period 1. It is therefore an
equilibrium for all legislators to vote yes in period 1, and it is not an equilibrium
for all to vote no.
5.2 Secret ballots
The agenda setter can exploit legislators even if they vote by secret ballot. Under
a secret ballot the agenda setter does not know who voted against him, and so
cannot later punish a particular defector. It appears that any one legislator
20Actually, the legislator is indifferent and might as well vote yes. Proposition 1 is therefore
robust, in the sense that it is still an equilibrium to approve the first proposal, and a minimum
winning coalition approves the proposal in period 2.
21Whereas federal congressmen and senators in the U.S. face no term limits, some states do
impose term limits for state legislators. Given that these limits are often longer than eight
years, they do not seem to restrict the agenda setter’s power so much that he must form a
minimum winning coalition of beneficiaries in each period.
22Office holders may believe that a term limit will not be applied. An example of extending
term limits is mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York City who won election to a third term.
22
would want to vote no in period 1, and it appears that he would want to do
so if with even a small probability he will be decisive. But suppose that each
legislator faces a risk of not serving in period 2. The agenda setter can then
threaten to give priority to new legislators in period 2 if the vote in period 1
is not unanimous. That is, in period 2 the minimum winning coalition would
include all new legislators, and (if needed) some continuing legislators. Each
legislator in period 1 who expects others to vote yes has an incentive to vote
yes. Turnover can increase the agenda setter’s power.
The following formalizes this idea. Let a legislator continue in period 2 with
probability q. As before, in period 2, each member of the minimum winning
coalition gains by voting yes, and the proposal will be adopted. The probability
that a legislator belongs to the minimum winning coalition in period 2, condi-
tional on his continuing to serve, is pC ≡ 2q2/3 + (1 − q2) when members of
the minimum winning coalition are chosen first from continuing legislators, and
pN ≡ 2q2/3+ (1− q)q when new legislators have priority in becoming members
of the minimum winning coalition.
Consider a given legislator in period 1 and suppose that all other legislators
vote no. In voting yes he obtains − (1 + δq) /3 + qδpC/3. A legislator who
votes no does not reduce his tax payments, but does cause the agenda setter
to give priority to new legislators, yielding the legislator expected benefits of
− (1 + δq) /3 + qδpN/3. Given that pC > pN , the difference is strictly positive;
thus, a legislator strictly prefers to vote yes in period 1.
Could a symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies have all legislators
in period 1 vote no? Denote by x the number of no votes in period 1. Suppose
the agenda setter threatens that in forming the minimum winning coalition in
period 2 he will give priority to new legislators with probability r(x). Assume
further that r(x) strictly increases with x. The agenda setter is willing to follow
such a strategy, because it costs him nothing. Consider period 1 and suppose
all legislators vote no. Again a single vote does not affect the collective decision
which rejects the proposal. But a legislator who votes yes increases the chances
that a continuing member will belong to the minimum winning coalition. Hence,
conditional on continuing to serve, a legislator’s expected utility in period 2 is
1
3
δ
(
−1 + (1− r(x))pC + r(x)pN
)
.
The legislator will have to pay taxes in period 2, and his chances of belonging
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to the minimum winning coalition decline with r(x). Voting yes makes x = 2,
whereas voting no makes x = 3. The legislator strictly prefers to vote yes if and
only if r(3) > r(2). Hence, a legislator strictly prefers to vote yes in period 1;
unanimous opposition is not an equilibrium.
5.3 Large legislatures, and partisan benefits
Consider the agenda setter’s power when the legislature consists of more than
three members. For simplicity let the number of legislators, n, be an odd num-
ber.23 As before, assume simple majority voting, and let the agenda setter play
the exclusion strategy. Again, a minimum winning coalition will support his
proposal in period 2.
Consider period 1. Suppose all legislators vote yes, so that no individual
vote is decisive. The expected utility of a legislator who votes yes is −(1 +
δ)/n + δ(n + 1)/(2n2). The first term is the taxes paid in both periods, as
both proposals are approved. The second term represents the expected value
of obtaining δ/n with probability (n + 1)/(2n). Voting no in period 1 yields
−(1+δ)/n. The difference δ(n+1)/(2n2) is strictly positive. Again, a legislator
will strictly prefer to vote yes in period 1: it is an equilibrium for each legislator
to vote yes in period 1. The agenda setter benefits from larger legislatures, as
(n + 1)/(2n), the share of the surplus given to the minimum winning coalition
in period 2, decreases with n.
As in our previous analysis, in period 1 this is the unique robust equilibrium
with symmetric pure strategies. A legislator who expects all others to vote no
strictly prefers to vote yes, because his vote does not change the outcome but
assures the legislator of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in period
2. Voting no makes him belong to this coalition with the smaller probability
(n+ 1)/(2n).
Large legislatures allow us to consider super-majority rules. As now approval
of the proposal in period 2 requires more legislators, the agenda setter can
extract a smaller surplus in period 2.24 It can be shown, however, that if the
23This assumption simplifies the exposition. Proposition 1 extends to even-sized legislatures
with at least four members requiring n/2 + 1 votes for approval. A two-person legislature is
special: majority rule effectively becomes a unanimity rule and each legislator is decisive.
24In the context of Proposition 1, the agenda setter makes no payments in period 1. With
more than three legislators the payments in period 1 in the context of Proposition 2 become
1/n− δ(n −m)/(n(n−m+ 1)), where m is the number of yes votes necessary for approval.
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majority requirement is less than unanimity, the preceding argument applies,
and in period 1 all legislators vote for a policy that hurts all of them.
The results continue to hold when the agenda setter restricts benefits to
members of the majority party. Suppose a majority party has n members and
a minority party has m members, with n > m + 2.25 Minority party members
expect to be excluded from a future minimum winning coalition because the
agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy, but promises future benefits only to
members of the majority party.26 The analysis described at the beginning of
this section can be applied, and so the following constitutes a subgame perfect
equilibrium: the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy restricted to mem-
bers of the majority party; the proposal in period 1 is approved with the votes
of the majority party; the agenda setter’s proposal in period 2 is approved by
a minimum winning coalition (excluding at least one member of the majority
party).
Partisan behavior makes our assumption of a finitely repeated game (rather
than of an infinitely repeated game) seem appropriate. An election after period
2 might change the majority party and the agenda setter. In the next term
the new agenda setter and legislature might play a similar subgame perfect
equilibrium.
6 Overcoming the agenda setter’s power
Some institutional arrangements, such as entitlements, may reduce the agenda
setter’s power by reducing his discretion, and other factors can increase a legis-
lator’s ability to resist exploitation.
6.1 Tacit collusion against the agenda setter
In the two-period model the agenda setter exploits the legislature. Such ex-
ploitation raises the question whether legislators can somehow agree on reject-
ing exploitive proposals completely. We show now that if the legislators are
expected to punish deviations appropriately, then tacit collusion against the
These payments increase with m.
25For simplicity take n to be an odd number.
26Speaker Joseph Cannon, mentioned above, appeared to follow this strategy, in allowing the
leader of the minority party to appoint the minority members of committees. See Finocchiaro
(2002).
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agenda setter might occur. To allow for such an agreement consider a repeated
game: in each period the game continues with positive probability. Suppose
also that at the beginning of each period all players know whether the game
will continue after that period.27 As usual, this framework admits a multiplic-
ity of equilibria and very different outcomes can be sustained; we will see that
when legislators cannot reach an agreement, they might be exploited in every
period.
Suppose that in each period, the game ends with probability 1− δ > 0, and
continues with probability δ > 0. Whether period t is the final one is revealed
to all players at the beginning of period t, before a proposal is made. The same
agenda setter makes proposals in all periods.
The agenda setter modifies the exclusion strategy in the following way. In
all but the final period he proposes to retain the whole budget for himself and
threatens that in the final period he will exclude any legislator who had earlier
voted against a proposal the agenda setter had made. In the final period,
the agenda setter proposes to split the benefits equally with the members of a
minimum winning coalition. All legislators who supported him in all periods
before the final one have an equal chance of belonging to the minimum winning
coalition in the final period. If a minimum winning coalition requires more
members than the number of legislators who supported all proposals before the
final period’s proposal, then the remaining members are chosen, taking into
account the number of times each legislator had voted for the agenda setter’s
proposals. That is, the two legislators with the most yes votes participate with
probability 1 (in case of ties, equal probabilities are assigned).
Consider the following strategy profile for each of the three legislators. In the
final period each legislator votes yes if and only if he belongs to the minimum
winning coalition. Consider non-final periods. In the first period each legislator
votes no. Each legislator continues to vote no in any non-final period t as long as
all legislators had voted no in all previous periods. If at least one legislator voted
yes in the past, then all legislator approve the next K proposals. So punishment
requires the approval of K non-final proposals. These are the symmetric pure
voting strategies in Proposition 1.
Consider the final period. Again, a minimum winning coalition will approve
27Tacit collusion can also be sustained under a finite horizon of at least three periods. But
this requires asymmetric behavior of symmetric legislators, see Appendix A.2.
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the proposal the agenda setter makes.
Consider a non-final period t, with all legislators voting no (that is, they
cooperate). Doing so yields zero payoffs in all non-final periods and −1/9 in the
final period; and because with probability 1− δ period t+ 1 is the final period,
with probability δ(1− δ) period t+2 is the final period, and so on, a legislator’s
expected payoff is
−
1
9
(
(1− δ) + δ(1− δ) + δ2(1− δ) + . . .
)
= −
1
9
.
Now suppose that one legislator votes yes in period t (that is, he defects).
Notice that the payoff in period t is still zero, as the proposal is rejected by
the majority. Because the consequence is punishment from fellow legislators,
in the next K non-final periods the payoff is −1/3. The reward is certain
membership in the minimum winning coalition yielding zero payoffs in the final
period, because the deviator maintains a lead of one yes vote over the fellow
legislators in all subsequent periods. Because with probability δ period t+ 1 is
a non-final period, with probability δ2 period t+2 is a non-final period, and so
on, a legislator’s expected payoff is
−
δ
3
(
1 + δ + δ2 + · · ·+ δK−1
)
.
Cooperation is thus sustainable if and only if
3δ
1− δK
1− δ
≥ 1.
This inequality holds if the discount factor is large enough, because then it is
sufficiently unlikely that the game ends soon, and thus the threat of punishment
is sufficiently severe. Because the left-hand side increases withK, a longer length
of punishment can sustain cooperation for lower discount factors.
The agenda setter cannot reduce the sustainability of tacit collusion through
increased side payments. In the first period a single deviation cannot trigger
side payments, as the proposal is still rejected. In later periods the proposal
is approved as part of the punishment, and side payments cannot be credibly
offered.28
28A natural extension of the equilibrium with symmetric pure strategies in period 1 has
each legislator in the final period vote yes if and only if he belongs to the minimum winning
coalition, and in non-final periods each legislator votes yes. So payoffs in non-final periods
are −1/3, and in the final period −1/9. If, however, a legislator deviates and votes no in any
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Thus, when the future is sufficiently important, legislators who use a grim
trigger strategy can eliminate exploitation completely. Other behavior, however,
is also possible, including the approval of exploitive proposals in every period
but the final one.
6.2 Counter-threats
The analysis so far had the agenda setter threaten legislators with political
exclusion, and allowed a legislator to take only one action—vote. A legisla-
tor might, however, react to the exclusion strategy with s = 0 by making a
counter-threat to exclude the current agenda setter if the legislator in question
later becomes the agenda setter. The following enriches the basic model to
capture this possibility; we show that in equilibrium the legislators will still be
exploited—albeit less than if different agenda setters, serving for two periods
each, each play the exclusion strategy with s = 0.
Let the legislature consist of five members, with one of them the agenda
setter, and with all paying taxes and voting. Voting occurs over two legislative
terms, each consisting of two periods. Legislator 1 is the agenda setter in the
first two periods; each of the other four legislators is equally likely to be the
agenda setter in the following two periods.29
Given our assumption of uncertainty over the future agenda setter and the
symmetry among legislators who are not the agenda setter in period 1, let each
react to the exclusion strategy with s = 0 by making the following counter-
threat: if the agenda setter in period 1 does not make a payment of s in period
1, he will be excluded from the minimum winning coalition in period 4 in case
the legislator making the threat becomes the agenda setter in period 3. If the
agenda setter makes the requested payment he will belong to the minimum
winning coalition in period 4 with certainty.30
non-final period, he does not affect policy and payoffs in non-final periods, but is punished
by the agenda setter in the final period, obtaining only −1/3. The difference is 2/9 > 0, the
analogue of the difference in the context of Proposition 1 that now takes into account the
infinite horizon.
29Excluding the possibility of legislator 1 being the agenda setter in the second term makes
the counter-threat more credible and exploitation in the first term more difficult.
30Again, the agenda setter is assumed to treat each legislator equally, which is here mo-
tivated by the uncertainty over the identity of the next agenda setter. Assuming that the
agenda setter of the second term is known and that payments in period 1 can be individu-
alized would not affect exploitation in period 1, but would affect the distribution within the
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Proceeding by backward induction, consider the last period. Notice that even
if the two agenda setters are both certain to belong to the minimum winning
coalition in the last period, one slot is still open, and the second agenda setter
can appropriately reward votes that had been cast in period 3. Note also that
the second agenda setter is willing to exclude or to include the agenda setter
of periods 1 and 2 in the last period’s minimum winning coalition because this
costs him nothing. Thus, it is an equilibrium for the second agenda setter to
play the exclusion strategy with s = 0, for the proposal he makes in period 3
to win unanimous approval, and for the proposal he makes in period 4 to be
approved by a minimum winning coalition that includes the first agenda setter.
Consider the first term, or periods 1 and 2. The preceding makes it clear
that for any exclusion strategy, an equilibrium exists in which the legislature
approves the proposals made in periods 1 and 2.
Consider the first agenda setter; call him A1. Suppose that A1 ignores the
threat, so that s = 0 and that A1 will be excluded from the minimum winning
coalition in period 4. On the other hand, if A1 gives in, he is assured of belonging
to the minimum winning coalition in period 4, at a cost of s. Giving in is better
if and only if −4s+ δ3/5 ≥ 0, which is equivalent to s ≤ δ3/20.
The optimal counter-threat thus has s = δ3/20. The above strategies thus
constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. We summarize with
Proposition 3 With two terms and a change in agenda setters, a subgame
perfect equilibrium exists in which:
In the first term
• the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy with s = δ3/20 and
• in period 1 the legislature unanimously approves the agenda setter’s pro-
posal; in period 2 a minimum winning coalition approves the proposal the
agenda setter makes in that period.
In the second term
• the agenda setter plays the exclusion strategy with s = 0 and
• in period 3 the legislature unanimously approves the agenda setter’s pro-
posal
legislature.
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• in period 4 a minimum winning coalition which includes the first agenda
setter approves the proposal the agenda setter’s proposal in that period.
A counter-threat benefits the legislators, but the first agenda setter still
obtains at least 4/5 of the period 1 benefits.
6.3 Entitlements
One may think that the agenda setter necessarily gains from committing future
policy. But here the opposite occurs. Suppose that whatever policy is adopted
in period 1 will also hold in period 2. Roughly speaking, instead of policies
subject to annual appropriations, we can think of entitlements which remain in
force unless explicitly changed. Then in period 1 the agenda setter could no
longer threaten to punish in period 2 a legislator who voted no in period 1. The
best the agenda setter could do in period 1 is to propose a policy that gives zero
net benefits to members of the minimum winning coalition; that generates lower
benefits to the agenda setter than he could obtain if he had set the agenda in
both periods.
A different question is behavior if the policy adopted in period 1 continues
in force in period 2, unless the agenda setter proposes an amendment, which the
legislature supports; that is, the default policy in period 2 is the policy adopted
in period 1, rather than no spending and no taxes in period 2. If in period 1
the legislature adopted a policy that gives all benefits to the agenda setter, in
period 2 the agenda setter of period 1 would not want to change the policy.
By assumption, only the agenda setter in period 1 can propose a new policy in
period 2. Therefore, in period 1 no legislator would support the policy that gives
himself negative benefits in period 1. The agenda setter does best in period 1
by proposing a policy that generates zero net benefits to each member of the
minimum winning coalition. Put differently, the agenda setter would prefer
annual appropriations over entitlements: the default policy strongly affects the
agenda setter’s power.
6.4 Separation of budgetary powers
Our results do not require that in each period the decisions on taxation and
spending are bundled. But if they are not bundled, they require that funds are
already approved.
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Let spending in each of the two periods be fixed at one dollar, so that the
three legislators vote only on how to allocate the dollar.31 In any period in
which the proposal is rejected, each legislator gets zero benefits. Assume that
the agenda setter plays an exclusion strategy in which he offers in period 2 a
small benefit b > 0 to members of the winning coalition.
In period 2, no member of the minimum winning coalition gains from voting
no, and the legislature passes it. Consider now a given legislator in period 1,
with all other legislators voting yes. When the legislator in question votes yes
he gets bδ2/3, whereas in voting no he gets nothing. Thus, a legislator strictly
prefers to vote yes in period 1, and it is an equilibrium for each legislator to
vote yes.32
Could a Nash equilibrium in symmetric pure strategies have all legislators
in period 1 vote no? If they do, a legislator who votes yes will belong to the
minimum winning coalition in period 2, obtaining bδ. Voting no reduces the
chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in period 2, so that total
payoffs are bδ2/3. Thus, a legislator strictly prefers to vote yes in period 1; it
is not an equilibrium for all legislators to no.
Put differently, the agenda setter would prefer separation of budgetary pow-
ers over combined taxation and spending decisions. But suppose that in period
2 the vote on taxes is held before the vote on spending. We just saw that the
agenda setter will offer to give very little of the spending to each member of the
minimum winning coalition. So all legislators, anticipating that, vote against
the tax. The agenda setter would then be unable to exploit in period 1.
7 Conclusion
It is well known that an agenda setter enjoys power which he can use to his own
benefit. But this paper showed much more, suggesting that by using promises
and threats the agenda setter in the initial period can gain all the benefits from
legislation, impose large costs on all legislators, while getting large majorities
to support such a selfish policy. So broad support for a policy need not mean
wide benefits from that policy.
31An analogous result holds if an entitlement program sets benefits to all legislators, but in
each period the legislature decides how to allocate taxes among its members.
32A technical issue concerns the existence of the optimal amount to offer. That may be
solved by making the realistic assumption that a smallest monetary unit exists.
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Conventional wisdom defines agenda-setting power as “the ability to make
proposals that are difficult to amend” (see e.g. Tsebelis and Garret 1996). Most
of the paper made the benchmark assumption that the agenda setter has such
absolute power. Not surprisingly, when this formal power is reduced (such as
when any one agenda setter serves for a limited time) exploitation is reduced.
The extreme assumption concerning the formal power of the agenda setter
allowed us to identify two additional informal conditions for exercising power.
First, power depends on the ability to reward and punish legislators, requir-
ing discretion or the ability to allocate future benefits. Entitlements remove
discretion completely. Exercising power also requires that the agenda setter
identify supporters in early periods. Though a secret ballot makes identifica-
tion impossible, we showed that when terms are staggered and legislators run for
re-election at different times (as in the U.S. Senate) the agenda setter’s power
is restored. Second, power depends on an individual legislators’ incentives to
resist exploitation. These incentives increase with the likelihood that a vote
is decisive, which likelihood is maximized under sequential voting; the incen-
tives to resist exploitation can also be sustained through tacit collusion by the
legislators, though other behavior is also possible.
Agenda-setting models can also apply to an autocrat in a nondemocratic
regime, because even an autocrat needs support for his policies from some, say
the political elite (see e.g. Diermeier and Fong 2011). With such an inter-
pretation, our analysis implies that the autocrat might be less constrained in
exploiting the elite than commonly thought. Moreover, the autocrat prefers
that his future power be restricted. For an autocrat with dictatorial powers in
the final period could not credibly promise future rewards, and would get little
benefits in earlier periods. Paradoxically, the expectation of more formal power
endows the proposer with less real power. Put differently, weakness creates
strength.
Our model can also apply to special interest politics. Suppose a special
interest group promises to give the agenda setter ten thousand dollars if the
legislature approves a policy that benefits the special interest, but harms the
legislators. The agenda setter uses his exclusion strategy to get the policy
passed. This strategy can explain the puzzle of the surprisingly small rent-
seeking expenditures by special interest groups, first noted by Tullock (1972).
Similar strategies can be used by a party leader to ensure the support of
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party members. An incumbent can incentivize loyalty of potential successors in
a current period by promising all candidates a chance of becoming his political
heir. Such an approach appears to have been used in 2013 by the head of the
Bavarian Government and ruling party, who refused to name his successor, but
instead kept alive the prospects of several candidates. The same approach was
used by prime minister Aznar in Spain.
The qualitative effects of our model can explain some stylized facts. For
example, the agenda setter does better for himself, and garners stronger ma-
jorities, in earlier periods of power than in his final term. That fits the pattern
of a lame duck president losing power. The results can also explain why an
agenda setter may not constrain future policy; the ability to change policy in
the future is precisely what gives the agenda setter the ability to threaten leg-
islators in earlier periods. And our analysis is consistent with the observation
that a legislative district may get more benefits the more closely allied are its
representatives with the agenda setter (which can be a political party control-
ling the central government). Evidence from the United States (see Larcinese,
Rizzo and Testa 2006), Spain (see Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro 2008), Israel
(see Rozevitch and Weiss 1993), Brazil (see Brollo and Nannicini 2012), and
Japan (see Tamura 2010) show that local governments under the control of the
same party as the central government receive higher transfers from the central
government.
The results of this paper can be viewed in at least three ways. First, the
results could explain the power that some agenda setters possess, as exempli-
fied by Speaker Cannon discussed in the Introduction. Second, the results can
be viewed as predicting that because an agenda setter can exercise so much
power, institutions may arise to limit such power. That indeed happened when
the House of Representatives changed its internal rules to reduce Speaker Can-
non’s power. Or, a legislature may allow amendments from the floor. And the
existence of multiple agenda setters, each in a different area, can reduce agenda-
setting power: if it will be long before the next time that area turns up, then
the agenda setter in that area must offer a large side payment for legislators to
approve his proposal.
Third, the results can suggest that though an agenda setter has the power
to induce a legislature to adopt policies which benefit him alone, agenda setters
often have goals other than personal benefits. Earlier we had discussed how
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an agenda setter may favor members of his own party. Or, as Margolis (1984)
suggests, political leaders may be altruistic at least in part, aiming to further
the public good, or to go down in history as benefactors of the country.
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A Appendix
A.1 Mixed-strategy equilibria in the benchmark
Under majority rule, the equilibrium in period 1 can also have each legislator
vote yes with positive probability less than 1. A mixed strategy allows for
trading off the increased chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition
in period 2 with the increased probability that an exploitive policy is approved in
period 1. This appendix explores, analogously to Proposition 2, the conditions
under which a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, and investigates whether the
agenda setter can offer sufficient side payments s to induce the equilibrium in
Proposition 1.
Consider a given legislator and suppose the other two legislators vote yes
with probability x. The increase in a legislator’s chances of belonging to the
minimum winning coalition in period 2 when he votes yes is greater the more
often the realizations of the other legislators’ mixed strategies in period 1 specify
a no vote . More precisely, expected payoffs are given by
x2
(
−
1
3
+ s+ δ
(
2
9
−
1
3
))
+2x(1−x)
(
−
1
3
+ s+ δ
(
1
3
−
1
3
))
+(1− x)
2
δ
(
1
3
−
1
3
)
,
which simplifies to
−
1
3
(
2x− x2 +
x2δ
3
)
+ sx(2− x).
On the other hand, a legislator who votes no in period 1 has a chance of
belonging to the minimum winning coalition in period 2 only when at least one
other legislator votes no, in which case the proposal in period 1 is rejected.
Expected payoffs are thus
x2
(
−
1
3
+ s−
δ
3
)
+ 2x(1− x)δ
(
1
6
−
1
3
)
+ (1− x)
2
δ
(
2
9
−
1
3
)
,
which simplifies to
−
1
3
(
x2 +
δ
3
(
x2 + x+ 1
))
+ sx2.
A legislator is indifferent between voting yes and no if and only if
x2 − x
(
1−
δ
6
)
+
δ
6
+ 3x(1− x)s = 0.
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Because this equation is quadratic, there exist two equilibria in mixed strate-
gies. Given the unique robust symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium described in
Proposition 1, in period 1 the number of symmetric equilibria is therefore three.
Figure 1 shows these equilibria for different side payments s and discount
factors δ. Given a side payment, say s = 0, which indicates the right-most dis-
continuous curve, for any δ the two mixed-strategy equilibria have very different
comparative statics. For the first equilibrium (the lower part of the discontinu-
ous curve), an increase in the discount factor δ increases the probability that a
legislator votes yes; in the second equilibrium (the upper part of the discontin-
uous curve) the opposite holds.33 As δ increases the mixed-strategy equilibria
converge toward each other.
Interestingly, with more legislators and a discount factor smaller than 1, this
convergence might be complete: mixed-strategy equilibria appear not to exist
for high discount factors. When the future is important enough, the legislator
strictly prefers to increase his chances of membership in the minimum winning
coalition in period 2 rather than to reduce the probability that an exploitive
policy is approved in period 1. For example, with five legislators and an agenda
setter, for a mixed-strategy equilibrium to exist the discount factor must be
smaller than 0.6.34
The right-most discontinuous curve in Figure 1 applies when s = 0; curves
further to the left are based on higher payments. The most the agenda setter
is willing to pay to each legislator to induce the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is
t = (1 − x3 − 3x2(1 − x))/3, because x3 + 3x2(1 − x) is his expected payoff in
33One could argue that the first equilibrium is more appealing than the second. First, it is
plausible that as the future becomes more important the proposal in period 1 is more often
approved. Second, as the discount factor approaches zero, the first equilibrium converges to
the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which the proposal is unanimously rejected. The
second equilibrium converges to unanimous approval. For δ = 0, unanimous approval is only
sustained in equilibrium because of a coordination failure. Third, for any discount factor the
expected payoffs are strictly higher at the first equilibrium. Lastly, when there is a collective
mistake in which everyone mixes with slightly different probability, the first equilibrium is
stable, whereas the second equilibrium is unstable.
34With five legislators, a mixed strategy allows for trading off the increased chance of
membership in the minimum winning coalition in period 2, given by δ(1−x)4(2/25)+ δx(1−
x)3(1/10)+ δx2(1− x)2(2/15)+ δx3(1− x)(3/20)+ δx4(3/25), with the increased probability
that an exploitive policy is approved in period 1, x2(1 − x)2/5. The former is always larger
than δ(1/2)4(16/75), whereas the latter is at most (1/2)4(1/15). Equality can therefore not
hold for large δ.
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period 1 from the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
The figure shows that when the discount factor is sufficiently large (roughly
greater than 0.6), the agenda setter can avoid a mixed-strategy equilibrium by
making side payments. For low discount factors, however, the equilibrium in
Proposition 1 cannot be induced. When the future is not sufficiently important,
a legislator little values membership in the minimum winning coalition in period
2, and strictly prefers to reduce the probability that an exploitive policy is
approved in period 1. In these situations playing a mixed strategy can thus
protect the legislature from complete exploitation—although it cannot eliminate
the exploitation completely.
A.2 Tacit collusion with a finitely repeated game
Even with only three periods the legislature can avoid payments to the agenda
setter in the first period, and reduce exploitation in the second. To do so
it requests (in the first two periods) side payments, threatening to play the
asymmetric equilibrium in the current period. Moreover, in the first period
the legislature can increase side payments further to 1/3 by threatening fellow
legislators to punish the acceptance of less than 1/3 by playing the unanimous
approval equilibrium in the second period. As in the main text, if in period 2
punishment of fellow legislators requires approval, the agenda setter does not
offer side payments. This increases the stakes in period 1 and makes it possible
to require higher side payments in the earlier period.
Suppose there are three periods and the agenda setter plays the exclusion
strategy as explained in the main text, but paying s1 and s2 in the first two
periods. We show that the legislature can request to set
sˆ1 = 1/3, sˆ2 = (2− δ)/6.
We say the second period is a punishment phase if some legislator vote yes
in the first period although side payments were strictly smaller than 1/3. In
this case set sˆ2 = 0 and notice that the agenda setter has no incentive to pay
more than that; he modifies the exclusion strategy accordingly.
Consider the following strategies:
• Legislator 1 approves all proposals, except if the second period is a pun-
ishment phase.
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• Legislators 2 and 3 vote yes in the final period if and only if they belong
to the minimum winning coalition. They vote yes on the first and second
proposal if and only if s ≥ sˆt, t = 1, 2.
We proceed by backward induction. Consider the final period. As before
the proposal is approved by a minimum winning coalition.
Consider period 2. Suppose it is the punishment phase. A legislator who does
not punish does not change policy but is less likely to belong to the minimum
winning coalition in period 3; so all punish. The agenda setter cannot do better.
Suppose it is not a punishment phase. Legislators 2 and 3 are pivotal and
(following the analysis in Subsection 4.1) prefer to vote yes if and only if s ≥ sˆ2.
Legislator 1 cannot change policy, and so cannot gain from voting against. The
agenda setter cannot do better than setting sˆ2 = (2− δ)/6.
Consider period 1. Suppose s1 = 1/3. A legislator who does not vote yes
does not change policy but is less likely to belong to the minimum winning
coalition in period 3; so all vote yes. Suppose s1 < 1/3. Legislators 2 and 3 are
pivotal. Voting yes ensures belonging to the winning coalition in period 3, but
implies that period 2 is a punishment phase, so the payoff is
−
1
3
(
1 + δ + δ2
)
+ s1 +
δ2
3
.
Not deviating and voting against foregoes current side payments but assures
side payments in period 2 yielding
−
1
3
(
δ + δ2
)
+ δsˆ2 +
δ2
6
= −
1
3
(
δ + δ2
)
+ δ(2− δ)/6 +
δ2
6
.
Voting against is beneficial because
−
1
3
+ s1 − δ(2− δ)/6 +
δ2
6
= s1 −
1
3
− δ(1− δ)/3 < 0.
Legislator 1 cannot change policy, and so cannot gain from voting against. Thus
the agenda setter cannot do better than offering sˆ1 = 1/3.
Similar to the infinite horizon, the finite horizon can sustain very different
behavior in equilibrium. Multiple periods can allow the agenda setter to ex-
ploit the legislature in more periods, and exploitation may appear for any finite
number of periods.
Consider T periods, denoted by t = 1, . . . , T . A value of T = 2 gives the
setting of Section 4. Again, the agenda setter modifies the exclusion strategy
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as stated in the main text, and a minimum winning coalition will approve the
proposal the agenda setter makes in the final period.
Consider now a given legislator in any period t before the final one, with
all other legislators voting yes in that period. Because a single vote does not
change the outcome of the collective decision which approves the proposal, by
voting yes the legislator obtains
−
1− δT−t
3 (1− δ)
+
2δT−t−1
9
,
the discounted value of tax payments in all periods plus the option value of po-
tential membership in the minimum winning coalition in period T . A legislator
who votes no does not reduce his tax, but excludes himself from future benefits,
yielding him expected benefits of
−
1− δT−t
3 (1− δ)
.
Because the difference is strictly positive, a legislator strictly prefers to vote
yes in periods t < T . It follows that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in
symmetric pure strategies with each legislator voting yes in each period t < T ,
and in the final period a minimum winning coalition approves the agenda setter’s
proposal.
Thus even under a finite horizon legislators can reduce exploitation consider-
ably. Again, other behavior is also possible, including the approval of exploitive
proposals in every period but the final one.
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Figure 1: Mixed-strategy equilibria for different values of δ and s.
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